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This paper brings together sociological theories of culture 
and gender to answer the question—how do large-scale 
development interventions induce cultural change? 
Through three years of ethnographic work in rural Bihar, 
the authors examine this question in the context of Jee-
vika, a World Bank-assisted poverty alleviation project 
targeted at women, and find support for an integrative 
view of culture. The paper argues that Jeevika created 
new “cultural configurations” by giving economically and 
socially disadvantaged women access to a well-defined 
network of people and new systems of knowledge, which 
changed women’s habitus and broke down normative 
restrictions constitutive of the symbolic boundary of gender.
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 Executive Summary 
 
 
This paper examines the nexus between development and culture.   We try to understand the 
process by which a large-scale anti-poverty intervention, in a very poor and patriarchal region of 
India, induced a cascading set of changes that led to the empowerment of women.   Through 
three years of qualitative fieldwork in rural Bihar, we examine this in the context of Jeevika, a 
poverty alleviation project assisted by the World Bank and implemented by the Government of 
Bihar. It provides a particularly interesting venue for examining the relationship between 
development and culture for three reasons:   
 
First, primarily targeted towards women and structured to induce rapid economic and cultural 
change, Jeevika began operations in six districts in 2006 and is projected to cover all 38 districts 
of Bihar and 12.5 million households by 2022. A project of this scale, gives us the opportunity to 
understand how cultural change can be brought about, not in one or two communities, but at a 
significantly large scale. Second, Jeevika operates in rural Bihar, a particularly ‘hard context’ 
with respect to existing inequalities – the state is one of the poorest in India, the population is 
almost 50% illiterate, and gender and caste hierarchies are oppressive – making cultural change 
very hard.   Third, our quantitative analysis of Phase1 of Jeevika suggests that it had considerable 
impact on women’s empowerment both within the household, and in the public sphere.  In this 
paper we dig further and ask – what are the processes and mechanisms of change that remain 
invisible in the quantitative study, but result in the social impact captured by it.  
 
By relying on qualitative data (semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions with 
members, non-members and key stakeholders, as well as participant observation of group 
activities), collected in four villages (i.e. two matched pairs of treatment and control villages) in 
the first phase of Jeevika over a three-year period i.e. from 2011 to 2015, we find support for an 
integrative view of culture. Comparing two pairs of treatment and control villages, we find that, 
by giving women privileged access to a) symbolic resources (that facilitate the formation of a 
new identity anchored in the SHG, rather than caste or kinship), b) physical resources (such as 
group money, access to credit and passbooks), and c) an associated institutional environment 
 (SHGs, VOs, CLFs, etc.), Jeevika cultivated new cultural competencies and capabilities that 
defied the traditional conventions of gender. Combined together, they give economically and 
socially disadvantaged women access to a well-defined network of people (women cutting across 
caste and religious boundaries, and both within and outside the village) and access to new 
systems of ‘knowledge’ with which they can challenge old generationally transmitted cultural 
systems that are more concerned with preserving boundaries rather than disrupting them. These 
changes manifest themselves most dramatically in the process of collective arbitration – as more 
women enter spheres of activity outside the household and participate in civic, political and 
financial institutions they further break down long-standing normative restrictions that were 
constitutive of the symbolic boundary of gender, thereby significantly changing both men’s and 
women’s ideas of what it means to be a woman.  
 
The paper demonstrates (1) that a development intervention is capable of inducing large-scale 
cultural change that leads to greater gender equality, and that (2) this is not simply a matter of 
making behavioral “nudges” at the individual level, but is akin to creating a mini-social 
movement within the village that challenges traditional structures of power and patriarchy.   
 
This paper is the first in a series that conducts an in-depth examination of the Jeevika project.  In 
a forthcoming paper we will study the nuts and bolts of targeting, mobilization and facilitation in 
Jeevika i.e. the frontline work of the project that led to these outcomes.   
  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Development, both macro-economic transformations of infrastructure and the economy as well 
as interventions designed to improve community lives and livelihoods, influences our material 
and non-material lives (incomes, access to goods and services, ideas, and aspirations). Among its 
many impacts, development also influences culture. Economics, anthropology, and development 
studies have a long history of studying development interventions, including their interaction 
with and impact on culture. Anthropologists have for long focused on the interaction between 
culture and development (Geertz 1963, Srinivas 1966, Singer 1972). And, of late, economists 
have also tried to understand the role of culture in economic growth and well-being (Rao and 
Walton 2004, Alesina et al 2013, Platteau and Peccoud 2013). In sociology, initial scholarly 
interest in development was focused on understanding the historical origins of the transition to 
capitalism and the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein 1974) and the role of the different 
social classes in the transition to modern democracy (Moore 1967). Subsequently, scholarly 
interest focused on labor laws and protests under different economic regimes of production (Lee 
2007) and a focus on workers in the formal and informal sectors of non-Western ‘developing 
nations’ (Lee 1998, Agarwala 2013). 2 Within sociology, scholars have only recently turned their 
attention to development interventions and the relation between development interventions and 
culture (Dworkin and Blankenship 2009; Sanyal 2009, 2014; Watkins and Swidler 2012, 2013). 3 
                                                      
2 Cultural change induced by development is a theme in ‘modernization theory’ (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005), but it has since been criticized. 
3 For a review of sociology of development, see Viterna and Robertson (2015). 
 
 Studying the relationship between culture and development poses certain challenges.  
First, theories of what constitutes culture abound with each theory identifying a unique element 
as culture – norms and values, “habitus”, “tool kit”, “symbolic boundaries”, meaning making – 
and often rejecting other views. 4 Second, and more contentiously, the study of culture in poor 
communities has been tainted by the legacy of “culture of poverty” and the related tendency to 
link cultural pathologies with people from economically disadvantaged and socially marginalized 
categories. 5 Third, the dynamics of cultural change are not very easily observed since cultural 
change usually occurs over generations and historical periods. And the causal mechanism at 
work often cannot be clearly identified.   
 A key site in which we can study how development interventions interact with culture 
and induce cultural change is gender. For the past few decades, anti-poverty interventions have 
targeted women as beneficiaries in pursuing the goal of ‘gender-mainstreaming’ in poverty 
eradication programs (Kabeer 2003). 6 Women have been given access to material and non-
material ‘benefits’ ranging from microcredit loans and savings, cash transfers, skills training, 
etc., on the assumption that these will facilitate greater human development and women’s 
                                                      
4 Recently, Patterson (2014) has proposed an integrative view of culture.  
 
5 Lamont and Small (2008) have proposed a new framework of culture that helps us understand 
culture’s causal influence on poverty free of the racializing tendencies of previous scholarship. 
6 See Kabeer (2003) for an analysis of how poverty eradication programs have evolved since the 
nineteen seventies till now to incorporate gender.   
 empowerment. One example is microcredit programs, which have been globally popular and 
disseminated worldwide since the 1990s.7  
This paper is based on a study of an antipoverty development intervention, Jeevika 
(meaning livelihood or subsistence), targeted at women and structured to induce rapid economic 
and cultural change. We observed the intervention in action as it rolled out and examined the 
process of facilitated cultural change. We used a quasi-experimental methodology using matched 
pairs of “treatment” and “control” villages combined with qualitative data (personal interviews 
and focus groups with program participants, non-participants, women, and men) collected over a 
three year period.  
The four villages (two treatment and two control) studied here are a subset of a sample of 
400 villages (200 treatment and 200 non-treatment) that were the subject of a survey in 2011 
(across 4,000 households). The survey asked retrospective questions on changes observed by 
respondents between 2006 and 2011. Quantitative analysis of that data using propensity score 
matching methods found that Jeevika had a large and significant impact on women’s 
empowerment measured as physical mobility, participation in decision-making, political 
participation, and confidence in undertaking collective action (Datta 2015). Women in treatment 
households had improved physical mobility (going to grocery stores and health centers, visiting 
                                                      
7 The focus on women is guided by a complex set of assumptions and rationales: men are not as 
compliant clients as women with regard to the repayment of credit; women make more family-
friendly use of credit; poor women do not have access to credit and by giving them collateral-
free loans they can start or boost their small-scale income-earning enterprises and, thereby, 
become more empowered. 
 relatives outside the village) and higher levels of participation in panchayat meetings, a key 
grassroots political institution.8 They also participated more in decision-making about the 
household’s primary livelihood activity and political preference and about their own work. 
Overall, the quantitative analysis suggests that, compared to Jeevika’s success in achieving its 
targeted economic impacts, its social impact on achieving women’s empowerment were 
“substantially deeper” (Datta 2015, 9).9  
In this paper, our aim is to illuminate the processes of change with respect to culture and 
gender that remain invisible in the quantitative study but resulted in the social impacts captured 
                                                      
8 In control areas, a 3-3.5% of women attended panchayat meetings, whereas, in treatment areas 
5.8-6.5% more women attended these meetings. 
9 On the economic-poverty front the biggest impact of the intervention was found to be 
restructuring the debt portfolio of borrowing households – compared to control households, 
households enrolled in the intervention had a significantly lower high cost debt burden (for 
example, money borrowed from moneylenders); were able to access smaller loans repeatedly; 
and borrow more often more for productive purposes (livestock and petty business) than for 
health and wedding expenses. Other economic impacts included increased ownership of cows 
(although not buffaloes, whose milk is more profitable) and mobile phones and somewhat 
improved food security. Among treated households, 0.5% of them take up animal husbandry as a 
primary source of livelihoods. However, more significant things like patterns of land ownership 
and land leasing for agriculture remained unchanged, showing that the place of agriculture as a 
livelihood source had remained the same with neither more movement toward (project aim) nor 
away from agriculture (Datta 2015). 
 by it. This is an important intellectual agenda because much of the discussions in the scholarly 
and policy circles of development about how poor people’s behaviors (financial and non-
financial) can be changed are currently dominated by development and behavioral economists 
(World Bank 2015). These discussions focus on figuring out the optimal mix of costs, incentives 
and information that can nudge individuals to behave in desired ways. What is frequently 
neglected in this way of thinking is an effort to understand the sociological underpinnings of 
behavior and the negotiated relational processes at the household and community levels that are 
an integral part of such changes.  
In our view, our findings support an integrative view of culture. Jeevika, by giving 
women privileged access to symbolic resources (that facilitate the formation of a new identity 
anchored in the SHG, rather than caste or kinship), physical resources (such as group money, 
access to credit and passbooks), and an associated institutional environment (new collective 
entities created by the intervention), led to changes in norms and women’s habitus and cultivated 
new cultural competencies and capabilities that defied the classical conventions of gender. 
Jeevika created “cultural configurations” (Patterson 2014) that gave economically and socially 
disadvantaged women access to a well-defined network of people and access to new systems of 
‘knowledge’ with which they could challenge old generationally transmitted systems of 
knowledge that were more concerned with preserving gender boundaries rather than disrupting 
them.  
We begin the paper by discussing of the theoretical literatures on culture and gender.  We 
then discuss the local context, the key components of the development intervention, and the 
methodology.  Next, we turn to the empirical section where we focus on women’s physical 
mobility and their participation in the public sphere. By focusing on these two aspects we show 
 how gender - its associated norms, “habitus”, “cultured capacities” and “symbolic boundary” - 
are being challenged by a process of externally induced change in a very poor and highly 
patriarchal context.   We end the paper with a discussion of the findings and address the recent 
turn in contemporary development policy circles. 
 
CULTURE 
 
In this section we discuss the major sociological conceptualizations of culture. We also draw out 
propositions on what each concept offers about how development might impact culture.  
Social norms and values have made a recent comeback in sociology of culture after being 
rejected by cultural sociologists as explanations for actions following the seemingly 
deterministic role of norms portrayed in Parsonian sociology. Norms are collectively authorized 
prescriptive and proscriptive injunctions about behavior. There are “oughtness norms”, moral 
judgments about behaviors that are internalized, generating internal sanctions like guilt and 
shame. And there are “regularity norms”, behavioral regularities that generate social 
expectations, which if violated trigger external sanctioning (Hechter and Opp 2001, xiii). 
Cultural sociologists have recognized that norms are cultural productions in that they are 
narrations focused on producing “behavioral regularities” (Fine 2001, 141, 157). Opinion on the 
process of socialization into norms is split between arguments that it is achieved through the 
discursive mechanism of talk (Fine 2001) and the non-discursive mechanism of habituation 
(Bourdieu 1977). Viewed from this perspective, it should be important to evaluate development’s 
impact on changing the moral judgments that buttress actions and in generating new 
“behavioral regularities”.  
 “Habitus”, another dimension of culture, is the embodied consequence of objective 
opportunities and constraints and of the material environment surrounding us (Bourdieu 1977). 
 Elaborating on Mauss’s (1973, 73) theory of a deeply cultivated “habitus” of the body, Bourdieu 
articulated it with systems of gender and class stratification. “Habitus” is the individual 
manifestation, in the form of durable preferences (likings) and dispositions (temperaments and 
their corollary bodily manifestations), of objective conditions and constraints of life that are 
experienced by an entire collectivity of people and which are determined by the group’s 
structural position in a stratified society. Culture in this model is embodied and manifests 
through bodily practices that are individually cultivated through societal collaboration and have 
publicly recognized and shared meanings.  It suggests “strong socialization” (Lizardo and Strand 
2010, 211) that is achieved through non-propositional/ discursive mechanisms, i.e. through a 
slow process of modifying the body as individuals imbibe the practical knowledge and tacit 
presuppositions stored in objects and spaces in their lived material environments. Development’s 
impact on culture would, accordingly, have to be reflected in changing preferences and 
dispositions, practices and skills, and associated bodily manifestations, facilitated by changes 
induced by development in the opportunities and constraints under which a group lives.  
The “tool kit” approach to culture takes the view that “Culture influences action…by 
shaping a repertoire or “tool kit” of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 
“strategies of action” (Swidler 1986, 273)”, i.e. figure out how to act in ways that can enable 
them to meet their different life goals (1986, 277). 10  Culture consists of “symbolic vehicles of 
meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal 
                                                      
10 Vaisey (2009) has pointed out that this is the “justificatory” view of culture initially proposed 
by C. Wright Mills, where culture is seen as a repertoire of narratives, framings, and 
competencies that people use selectively and instrumentally.   
 cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life (1986, 273),” all of 
which Swidler later termed “cultured capacities” (2008, 614). The core argument is that 
“…action and values are organized to take advantage of cultural competencies (1986, 275)” 
rather than norms and values having causal influence on competencies or on actions. These 
“cultured capacities” are shaped by sources of influence that differ by the kind of times, times of 
relative stability versus times of instability and tumultuous change. Culture’s causal role in 
influencing cultural competencies and action is most obvious during “unsettled lives” (1986, 
278) when political and religious ideologies establish new ways of organizing individual and 
collective action by constructing new entities (selves, families, corporations) and by forging new 
rituals that reorganize taken-for-granted habits and modes of experience. Accordingly we should 
focus on investigating the extent to which development interventions have an unsettling effect by 
creating new entities that can inculcate new “cultured capacities” and ways of action, facilitate 
new forms of cooperation, and put into place new structures of authority. 
Symbolic and social boundaries are another way of viewing culture (Lamont and Molnar 
2002). Symbolic boundaries, in particular, are conceptual distinctions (which become symbolic 
resources) that social actors construct and subscribe to in order to classify people, practices, and 
objects into distinct categories. Gender, which is of specific interest to us in this paper, is one of 
several distinctions that are created and maintained via the use of symbolic resources for 
“boundary-making” (beliefs about worth and competence of women and men, ideas about how 
women and men should act and interact, i.e. conceptions about womanliness and manliness). 
These are discussed in detail in the subsection on gender. From this perspective, it is important to 
examine whether development interventions force dynamism into existing symbolic boundaries 
and subject them to revision. 
 The “dual process model” of culture integrates the two contradictory approaches to 
culture, the “justificatory” approach  (“tool kit”) and the motivational approach (norms and 
values), by distinguishing between “discursive” and “practical” modes of culture and cognition 
(Vaisey 2009, 1675; Vaisey 2008). Cultural schemas are deeply internalized, largely unconscious 
networks of associations built up over time that facilitate perception, interpretation, and action. 
From these schemas that are internalized into our practical consciousness arise moral intuitions – 
“the unreflective attractions and repulsions of practical consciousness – that have motivational 
influence on action (Vaisey 2009, 1684)”. But the connection between internalized morals and 
actions are not always apparent to the actors themselves and cannot always be captured in their 
own explanations of their behavior since individuals are prone to “discursive inarticulacy” 
(Vaisey 2009, 1704). The other half of culture is the consciously stated values and beliefs 
(discursive consciousness) that are verbally expressed as justifications for actions. Development 
interventions, then, can be expected to have bi-level impact on culture: on consciously and 
discursively stated values and beliefs and on internalized cultural schemas, which can be 
changed by interventions designed to give people repeated access to new experiences and by 
providing new stimuli that, over time, catalyzes new mental associations or revises existing ones. 
“Cultural configurations” is the most recent approach to culture and one proposed in an 
integrative effort in this diverse and contentious literature (Patterson 2014). Patterson theorizes 
culture as different forms of knowledge – declarative (facts and events), procedural (skills and 
“habitus”) and evaluative (norms and values). Bringing together all these elements under a single 
conceptual framework, Patterson has proposed a new concept: “Cultural configurations” – “the 
availability and activation by networks of persons of any ensemble of cultural knowledge and 
practices structured around a core set of values and norms motivated by a common set of 
 interests, goals, or needs. Configurations vary in duration, density, complexity, and availability. 
(Patterson 2014, 20)”  “Cultural configurations” have three features: “configural availability” – 
the number and variety of cultural configurations that are present in a certain context; “cultural 
focus” – the cultural configuration that is most commonly available to a group and salient for 
identity, emotional security and normal functioning; and the role of trust and norms”. Viewed 
from this perspective, we have to ask if development projects expand the “cultural 
configurations” available to communities and what are its implications.  
 
FROM DOING TO UNDOING GENDER  
 
We now turn to the sociological literature on gender to examine how gender has been conceived 
and the conceptions of culture that scholars of gender have relied on. From this discussion we 
delineate the diagnostics of change in gender behavior and relations that are relevant for our 
analysis. There are four principal traditions of thinking about gender – the institutional, the 
interactional, the structural , and the performative. The institutional perspective (Lorber 1994) 
views gender as a socially constructed system of stratification for maintaining inequality and 
subordination (of women by men). The focus in this approach is on the common belief in gender 
differences that pervades all social processes and organizations, and the concomitant 
institutionalized practices for constructing men and women as separate categorizes that are then 
hierarchically placed in relation to each other.  
The interactional perspective on gender highlights the interactional work in everyday 
situated conduct that is required to sustain gender, i.e. “doing gender” (West and Zimmerman 
1987). The two important elements are public normative expectations about sex-typed behavior 
and how individuals routinely comply with these by gendering their behavior, thus providing 
interactional validation of sex category distinctions, and conferring upon them their sense of 
 “naturalness” and “rightness” (1987, 147). “Doing gender involves a complex of socially guided 
perceptual, interactional and micropolitical activities that cast particular pursuits as expressions 
of masculine and feminine “natures.” (1987, 126)” Therefore, gender is a “routine, methodical, 
and recurring accomplishment (126)” that creates and sustains power inequality.  
The structural perspective on gender (Risman 2009) emphasizes the importance of 
understanding change in gender, or rather the process of “undoing gender”. This integrative 
approach views societies as having a gender structure that has implications at the individual, 
interactional, and institutional levels.  It produces gendered selves, generates interactional 
expectations from men and women, and gives rise to institutional forms of organizing and 
controlling men and women. Thus, the structural approach to gender, in keeping with 
structuration theory (Giddens 1984), recognizes the recursive causal relationship between gender 
structure, its power to produce compliance (through nonreflexive habituation and coercion), and 
the transformative power of non-conforming action that forces dynamism into gender structures 
(Risman 2004, 433). The two indicators of “undoing gender” that are emphasized by this 
approach are diminishing male privilege and the declining salience of sex categorization. 
Other scholars are less hopeful that we can ever achieve the utopian goal of making sex 
categorization non-salient because it has become an integral cultural and cognitive tool for 
human beings to organize relationships. However, these scholars argue that we might still aim to 
reduce sex-categorization’s implications for inequality through “social interventions that will 
create multiple, repeated instances of situations where women participate (more) equally and are 
acknowledged as equally competent to similar men at socially valued tasks (Ridgeway and 
Correll 2000, 114).” To understand how interactive participation-based interventions can be used 
to ameliorate the gender inequality arising out of sex categorization, it is useful to turn to status 
 construction theory (Ridgeway 1991; Ridgeway et al 1998; Ridgeway and Correll 2000). Beliefs 
about the status of a group of people play a crucial role in the process through which inequality 
across different dimensions is generated and justified. “Doubly dissimilar encounters” 
(Ridgeway et al. 1998, 334) – interactions, in the course of jointly working toward 
accomplishing a common goal, between individuals who belong to separate nominally different 
categories (in this case women and men) who are also different in their resource position (men 
generally having more resources than women) – play a vital role in the genesis and diffusion of 
beliefs, until they become consensually-held beliefs about the status value of the nominal 
categories (all men as valued and all women as devalued). A very important link in this process 
of how status beliefs gain firm consensual root in society is the belief of the societally devalued 
status group (women) that they are indeed less competent and hence of lesser value. A second 
important link is beliefs about the public perception (an individual’s guess about what most 
people think) of competence and worthiness of nominal categories (men and women), beliefs 
that are derived from the influence of and esteem given to particular men and women in specific 
encounters. “For people in both advantaged and disadvantaged categories, the formation of status 
beliefs turns on believing that most others agree that people of one category are more worthy and 
competent than those of another category (Ridgeway et al. 1998).”  
The performative perspective on gender has two distinct strands of theorizing, only one 
of which equips us to understand undoing gender. Butler’s theory of gender “performativity”, 
which highlights the “double contingency” of gender in a field of normative constraints imposed 
by innumerable and unspecified external actors, is centrally concerned with “undoing gender” 
(Butler 2004). In this view, gender is an “incessant activity performed, in part, without one’s 
knowing and without one’s willing (Butler 2004, 1).” However this does not make it automatic 
 or mechanical. Rather, this unceasing activity is “a practice of improvisation within a scene of 
constraint (1)” and is always done with or for another (real or imagined). Butler uses the word 
performativity referring to the capacity to produce through repetition and is interested in the 
transformative capacity inherent in repeated performances. Agency materializes in the 
improvisations through which normative behavioral prescriptions are actualized (always partially 
and imperfectly) through repeated practice, or in the “iterability of performativity” (Butler 2004: 
xxiv). Every performance or enactment of a norm opens the possibility of slight deviations from 
conforming to the norm’s socially endorsed meaning and from complying with its precise bodily 
practice, thereby, opening up the promise of undoing gender.  
The above elaboration makes it quite clear that for gender scholars, norms have been an 
acknowledged force in shaping ideational aspects such as desires and in guiding interactions and 
actions. Norms have been understood not only as internalized behavioral prescriptions that have 
in them implied notions of worth that are generative of desires but also as being coercive, i.e. 
injunctions that can be reinforced by external sanctioning. Along with norms, practice has 
received a place of prominence. In the scholarship on gender, there is no debate over 
socialization – whether and to what extent it is a discursive/ propositional versus non-discursive/ 
non-propositional process – and scholars have concluded from their various empirical studies 
that gender is both internalized (produces gendered selves) and also externally present and 
impinging through status expectations held by others and through institutional forces.  
A diagnosis of the process of undoing gender then should focus on a development 
intervention’s impact on the following: changing gender norms; undoing of the gender habitus; 
promoting non-conventional ways in which women and men act and interact; declining salience 
of sex categorization; diminishing male privilege; enhancing women’s (as a sex category) status 
 by creating interactional settings around socially valued tasks which privilege women’s 
participation and where women are acknowledged as equally competent to similar men; and 
also by changing the subjective and objective resources women have access to.  
 
THE CONTEXT 
Bihar has stark social inequality, 67 % rural literacy for men and 50% for women, and the lowest 
human development index (HDI) rank among all Indian states. Caste and gender hierarchies have 
been the most oppressive in Bihar, with upper caste men monopolizing control over economic 
and political power for a long period. Simultaneously however, Bihar also has had a long history 
of progressive movements that constantly challenged upper caste hegemony, including the 
mobilization of backward castes on affirmative action in the 1960s, the anti-landlord movement 
(led by Jayaprakash Narayan) in the 1970s, and the Naxalite movement in the 1980s. These 
movements had set the stage for lower caste leaders to capture the reins of power. In 1990, the 
movements culminated in Laloo Prasad Yadav, from the low-caste Yadav community, coming to 
power, with an explicit mandate of bringing lower castes into Bihar’s political arena. For the 
next fifteen years, more subordinate groups (particularly Yadavs and Muslims) had been brought 
into political society on their own terms. The end of the era of elite domination had been marked 
by an upsurge in identity politics that gave some measure of dignity and respect to previously 
downtrodden social groups (Varshney 2013).  
However these movements had limited success at remedying gender inequality. Amid the 
constant churning of caste and class alliances, the status of women and their empowerment had 
rarely been paid attention. Bihar ranked the lowest in the Gender Equality Index, and there had 
been a decline in absolute terms over an earlier period (Planning Commission 2002). For the 
most part, women in rural Bihar continued to be relegated to the private sphere of domesticity. 
 And lower caste women faced double subordination. Even in villages where women were 
allowed to enter the public sphere through affirmative action, they remained tethered to their 
subordinate status.  
In 2005, Laloo Yadav’s “democratically endorsed non-governance” (Mitra 2006: 103) 
was overthrown with Nitish Kumar (from the Kurmi caste) and his party Janata Dal (United) 
coming to power with its alliance partner, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). One of his leading 
election mandates was women’s empowerment. During his regime, existing programs on 
women’s empowerment were strengthened, and a new innovative program, the bicycles-to-girls 
program was launched. It was in the midst of this regime that Jeevika was piloted and 
implemented.  
 
THE INTERVENTION 
Jeevika, or The Bihar Rural Livelihoods Project, is a community-based anti-poverty intervention 
of the Bihar government. It was initiated in 2006 by a low-interest loan and “technical 
assistance” from the World Bank to the Government of Bihar.  The intervention’s main 
economic objective was livelihood expansion and poverty alleviation. 11 It also aimed to 
establish self-managed institutions for a majority of participant households – these were the 
SHGs (self-help groups). 12 It was an embodiment of participatory development that has 
characterized development assistance since the millennium (Mansuri and Rao 2012).  The target 
population was women from the poorest of poor families. Jeevika mobilized them into bankable 
                                                      
11 For details on the economic aspects of the intervention, see (Datta 2015).  
12 Worldwide, microcredit based interventions are largely targeted at women. The SHG based 
model of microcredit is common in India and preceded Jeevika. 
 SHGs of 10-15 women. They were then federated into Village Organizations (VOs), a group of 
10-15 SHGs, and finally into Cluster-Level Federations (CLFs) that spanned 35-45 VOs. The 
project was first piloted in six districts in 2006. It is expected to be in operation in all 38 districts 
of Bihar by 2022, covering 12.5 million households.  
At the SHG level, women came together in weekly meetings held in their neighborhood, 
saved ten rupees each at every meeting (forty rupees a month), and relied on their own funds for 
giving and taking out small loans (interloaning). In principle, these meetings were managed and 
run by three office bearers, or leaders – the President, the Treasurer, and the Secretary – elected 
from among the group members by the women. But because low literacy and numeracy were 
frequent obstacles, a Community Mobilizer (a man or woman with basic financial literacy skills) 
was appointed for account keeping. When SHGs matured, their bank accounts were opened in 
local (nationalized) bank branches, and they were linked to other SHGs to form VOs.  
At the VO level, a federation of 10-15 SHGs, meetings were held twice a month. These 
meetings were attended by all three leaders of each of the member SHGs (i.e. 30-45 women in 
attendance). There were several committees at this level – the loan repayment committee; the 
social action committee; and procurement committee. Similar to the SHG, each VO had its own 
elected leaders, who conducted the meetings, and a bookkeeper who managed the financial 
accounts.  These VOs, in turn, were federated to form CLFs that were responsible for enhancing 
livelihood activities. CLFs were being made the foundational organizational infrastructure for 
rolling out other programs and for linking up with government subsidy schemes. Thus, because 
of the intervention’s focus on women as its frontline clientele and because of the institutional 
design of the program, a significant institutional space and “associational mechanism” (Sanyal 
2009, 2014) had become available to women. 
  
METHODOLOGY 
 
The present analysis draws on three years of data from four villages, two where Jeevika has been 
operating since 2006 and two where it has not intervened. The “treatment” villages were selected 
at random from the set of treated villages in two different districts (counties) – Muzaffarpur and 
Madhubani.  Each “treatment” village was then matched with a set of “control” villages using 
propensity score matching methods (Imbens and Rubin 2015) on the basis of village level data 
from the 2001 government census on literacy, caste composition, landlessness, levels of 
outmigration, and the availability of infrastructure.  The statistical matching method gave us a 
choice of three possible controls for the treatment village in Muzaffarpur and two possible 
controls for the treatment village in Madhubani.  In order to find the closest treatment-control 
match, field investigators then visited the set of possible controls for two-days for visual 
inspection and qualitative assessment. This combined quantitative and qualitative matching 
method gave us two matched pairs of treatment and control villages, with each pair located 
within the same district. 13 For the purpose of keeping their identity anonymous,14 we have 
named the villages in Madhubani district Ramganj (treatment) and Virganj (control) and villages 
in Muzaffarpur district Saifpur (treatment) and Bhimpur (Control). See table 1 below. This 
method of sample selection allows us to compare the village with the intervention with its 
“untreated” statistical clone, allowing us to draw causal inferences about the effects induced by 
Jeevika.   
                                                      
13 This method is similar to Barron et al.’s (2011) sociological analysis of the impact of a 
development intervention in Indonesia. 
14 We have also kept the names of informants anonymous in the paper.  
     Table 1: Sample 
Jeevika Muzaffarpur Madhubani 
Treatment:  
(since 2006) 
1  
(Saifpur) 
1 
(Ramganj) 
Control 
 
1 
(Bhimpur) 
1 
(Virganj) 
TOTAL  
[N= 4 villages] 
2 2 
 
The two villages in Madhubani are divided into segregated and caste-homogenous 
habitations or tolas. The Brahmins are a majority in both villages, and their tolas are located 
close to the main resources of the village – the temple, pond and school – and all other tolas 
extend southwards in decreasing order of status in the caste hierarchy, with the Schedule caste 
(SC)15 communities being located farthest south. Each of these communities is also spatially 
segregated. The SC communities of both villages are mainly comprised of Musahar, Pasi, Ram, 
and Dhobi subcastes, and the Other Backward caste (OBC) communities are comprised of 
Yadav, Mandal, Badhai, Hajaam, and Teli subcastes. The only big difference between Ramganj 
and Virganj is that the former has a sizeable Muslim population, comprising Sheikhs, Ansaris, 
Nutts and Pamariyas, while in the latter, there is only one Muslim (Sheikh) family in the entire 
village. Inhabitants of both villages primarily depend on agriculture and related activities for 
their livelihood. The two villages in Muzaffarpur district are largely similar to the ones in 
Madhubani with the important differences being that they are both primarily bazaar (market)-
centric and the dominant caste is the Chaudhury, who belong to the business community.  
                                                      
15 Groups of formerly “untouchable” castes that are included in a “schedule” of the Indian 
Constitution in recognition of their historic marginalization and subordination.  
 In each of these villages, first, preliminary studies were conducted using several 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA)16 methods to gain an understanding of the layout of the 
village. Following this, qualitative data was collected in twelve cycles over three years from 
2011 to early 2015.  Every three to four months, a team of four field investigators (recruited from 
a local research-based NGO) accompanied by one of the three principal researchers would visit 
the villages for a cycle of data collection. Qualitative data were collected through a variety of 
methods: a) personal interviews (open-ended structured and unstructured) and conversations with 
program participants and non-participants; b) focus group discussions with participants and non-
participants; c) passive observation of group meetings, trainings, workshops, mobilization drives 
and interactions at several levels (village, block, district); d) structured interviews with Jeevika 
staff at all levels in all villages; and finally e) interviews and focus groups with men and other 
key stakeholders in the village (religious heads, village council members, moneylenders, 
subsidized food shop dealers, landlords, and other public officials). The interviews, observations 
and focus group discussions were guided by a set of themes that were modified throughout the 
data collection. The interviews were conducted in the local language (Hindi and Maithili) by 
researchers, transcribed in English, and coded in QSR NVivo (a qualitative data analysis 
software). During the coding, some themes were preselected to match the themes of the 
questions asked, but we also allowed themes to emerge from the data in an inductive mode.  
                                                      
16 PRA methods are simple mapping, graphics and other analytical tools that are used in 
development interventions to allow largely illiterate populations to reveal information about their 
living conditions within focus group settings.  
 These multiple cycles of data, coupled with the matched experimental design, allow us to 
understand cause-effect relations and the mechanisms of change over time. We are able to study 
social processes as they unfold in the villages with the evolution of Jeevika, rather than being 
solely reliant on informant recall. In addition, having a comparison in the control villages and 
across districts allows us to capture variation in processes that occurred in similar rural 
landscapes. In addition, the qualitative nature of the study permits us to incorporate the 
participants’ own evaluative metrics and to understand why the women prioritize certain 
transformations over others. From our data analysis, which aims at identifying the changes 
prioritized by women, four dimensions of change emerge to the top. These are increased physical 
and spatial mobility; group solidarity; access to money; and finally access to public spaces of 
deliberation and action. Because of space constraints, in this paper we focus on mobility and 
access to the public sphere.  
 
I. Physical & Spatial Mobility 
 
 Control Villages and Non-joiners in Treatment Villages 
 
In rural Bihar, spatial mobility implies taking control over one’s body and staking claim on 
public spaces. Until a few of decades ago, the spatial boundaries within which women could 
move about without the risk of jeopardizing their gender status – how far women could travel, 
where women could go with or without being accompanied, and what they could do in those 
spaces – were firmly drawn and upheld by sanctions. Being a woman and femininity were 
associated with the domesticated space of the home, where women served and had their safety 
protected by men.  
 In control villages, men’s views revealed the dominant narratives about conventions. 
Men typically spoke of mobile women as immoral and perceived the public domain of local 
bazaars (markets) as threatening to women’s modesty and sexuality. 
Man: No no, women should not go out alone [oughtness norms]. Many women go 
to the market, and then they run away. They do go once in a while [regularity 
norms], but they should not go alone or just like that. They should only venture out 
if there is some need or work [oughtness norms]. 
Researcher: Do you see women sitting together and chatting sometimes?  
Man: Yes, they do sit and talk among themselves. During long summer days, they 
sit under a tree and talk [regularity norms].  
Researcher: And, do you approve of this?  
Man: It’s ok at some level, but I think it’s wrong [oughtness norms]. They are 
influenced by the witch (or dayan, referring to a widowed nurse in the village who 
often tries to organize women to bring them together and circulate information 
about public health and sanitation). She teaches them how to speak and fight with 
others. One woman got influenced by her, and she was finally sent to jail. Now no 
one says anything.  
(Virganj, Cycle 2, Virendra Mishra, Brahmin tola) 
 
This excerpt indicates that the moral codes of behavior were resistant to change even 
though regularity norms had yielded to some extent to the pressure of changing times and 
needs. Behavioral patterns that deviated from conventions of gendered behavior were 
decried, non-conforming women who instigated breaks with convention were depicted as 
witches, and women who moved about unmonitored were depicted as immoral.  
The husbands of non-joiners in treatment villages expressed similar views.  A 
police officer in Ramganj used the discourse of male competency and protectionism to 
justify why women’s place should be in the household.   
It is a man’s duty to provide for his wife. If he can’t do that, it’s his fault. That’s 
when his wife has to step out of the house. You ask about mobility, I’ll tell you – 
no more than ten percent of the women in the Sheikh tola (Muslim neighborhood) 
leave their homes [regularity norm], including mine. Now you might think this is 
shaasan (domination/ control), but that’s not what this is. It’s just inconvenient to 
 let her out, and I’ll tell you why. If I let her out, she will have to be accompanied 
by someone sent by me. Also, she cannot go beyond the destination she has sought 
permission for. So at every point it’s not full freedom, you see. Her freedom will 
always be regulated by me. So what’s the point?! At the end of the day, a woman 
belongs to the house (aurat ghar ka saamaan hai17). If she starts earning and steps 
out, I’ll lose all my rights over her!  
(Ramganj, Cycle 6, Emaduddin, Constable, Sheikh tola)  
 
These gender norms were tied to caste affiliation. While upper caste women simply could 
not step out of their homes and neighborhoods, lower caste women who had to step out of their 
homes and beyond their neighborhoods could not get societal consent. For Brahmins, Kayasths, 
Bhumihars, Rajputs (all Hindu upper/ forward castes) and Sheikhs (Muslim upper caste) alike, 
their own aangan (courtyard) was their world. Some of them spoke of their limited mobility as a 
matter of pride and saw it as being linked to their husband’s accomplishment of the classic 
provider-and-protector masculinity.  
Why do I need to step out of the house if my husband is providing for me! 
(Virganj, Cycle 2, Dhobi tola FGD) 
 
Women should not set foot outside their threshold. Women from the Brahmin 
community will starve to death, but they won’t step outside. 
(Virganj, Cycle 8, Rani Devi, Brahmin tola) 
 
However, the political empowerment of lower caste groups and a dramatic rise in male 
out-migration (particularly from the lower castes) had introduced subaltern discourses that were 
frequently contradictory to the dominant discourse. In many focus group discussions with Yadav 
and Paswan women, some women (particularly wives of migrants) argued that life would be 
difficult if a woman did not step outside (Ramganj, Cycle 2, Paswan tola FGD). However, a 
                                                      
17 The literal translation of saamaan is objects, inanimate things. This quote implies that a 
woman is an object of the house and should remain within its confines. 
 majority of women who had to go out did not glorify this liberty and saw it as symptomatic of 
male deficiency. They perceived sitting at home and doing household work as “… a luxury, 
available only to women from well-to-do and decent families. (Bhimpur, Cycle 2, Shakeela 
Khatoon)” Women’s need to be physically mobile was seen by women and men as symptomatic 
of male deficiency and a husband’s failure to be a provider. Occasionally, Brahmin women 
whose husbands had migrated did not see any harm in stepping out of the house into the public 
domain to fulfill their family’s caregiving needs. The importance of women’s physical 
movements in maintaining the symbolic boundaries of gender, caste and class was strongly 
expressed in these responses. And the household as a physical and symbolic space emerged as 
being salient to the legibility of females as ‘wifely’ instead of ‘wayward’.  
 
Institutionally Induced Mobility  
  
Once Jeevika was introduced, women from lower and upper castes were drawn into Jeevika’s 
fold where they were forced to be mobile. Performing the role of a Jeevika didi18 meant that 
women had to attend mandatory weekly meetings of their SHG for savings and loan activities. 
These meetings were usually held in the open courtyard of one of the three group leaders’ 
houses. Women selected to be group leaders had to additionally attend VO meetings twice a 
month with the leaders of all the SHGs in a VO. One of these meetings addressed all 
intervention-related non-financial matters and the other addressed financial matters (loans and 
repayment). At times, group members were allowed a chance to appear at the VO meetings to 
make a direct case for loans. These meetings were held in public places such as temples, 
panchayat buildings, or schools. Group leaders and sometimes group members had to go to local 
                                                      
18 Didi means elder sister. 
 banks for conducting financial transactions (such as drawing out loans). As a result, many of the 
Jeevika women, for the first time, laid claim to spaces that had traditionally been out bounds. A 
smaller number of the women who were selected to serve as CMs (community mobilizers) and 
CRPs (community resource persons) had to travel even further than their village boundaries. A 
select few had to travel beyond their district, the state and even beyond India for mobilization 
drives, immersion trips, and trainings. As a result of their stepping out for Jeevika work, women 
had also started stepping out into public domains, like markets, schools, and village government. 
Thus, the symbolic spatial boundaries that provided the edifice for the construction of gender 
identities had begun to get dismantled with pressure from the intervention’s institutional 
requirement of mobility.  
 
Institutionally Constructed Identity & Discourses  
 
The new discourse carefully crafted by Jeevika focused on disembedding identity from caste and 
religion and instead sought to anchor it class categories. ‘Gareeb didi’ (poor sister) was the most 
common refrain in Jeevika’s trainings and workshops. For instance, in one such training in 
Madhubani, a Jeevika staff member was providing a refresher course to the CRPs in preparation 
for their upcoming CRP drive19 in another state. The central purpose of this training was building 
and bolstering the collective identity of the women as ‘gareeb didi’ and exhorting them to take 
pride in that identity. The two most repeated sentiments at the training were – “We have one 
religion and one religion alone, and that is poverty”, and “We’re poor, we’re defenseless, so 
what?” This conversion of a class category (poor) to a cultural category (religion) is significant 
                                                      
19 CRP drives are focused on mobilizing women to enroll in Jeevika SHGs and are conducted 
when the intervention enters new areas. 
 and can be interpreted as a strategic institutional effort at reorienting identity around economic 
disadvantage, but recasting it in conceptually familiar terms without launching a more 
revolutionary discourse calling for the abandonment of caste and religious distinctions. 
 Through role play, games, songs, folk tales, street theatres, narration of real-life field 
stories, the staff worked on inculcating a sense of we-ness, ownership, of rising above the 
individual as a unit of focus and interest. Women rehearsed and performed these new identities, 
momentarily suspending their caste and religious affiliations. They were asked to denounce the 
idea that women are domesticated and meant only to serve their family. The staff members spoke 
about how what is considered feminine is shaped early right from the toys girls and boys play 
with, how gendered valuations pervade parental decisions about girls and boys schooling, and 
treatment by in-laws.   These ideas were enthusiastically received by the women CRPs who often 
joked, interjected, and added examples from their own experiences.  
 Every woman was encouraged to narrate and bring her own life story to the forefront 
during the mobilization process.  Those who were shy were egged on by the other women in the 
group and by the facilitators, who often worked with the women on specific details such as body 
language, eye contact, occupying space in a room, and other techniques that could help them 
boost their confidence and become better mobilizers. They sang several songs together and told 
each other folk tales, all of which drove home the point that the problems of a woman neck-deep 
in poverty can only be understood by another poor woman, and only she can help pull her out of 
this vicious cycle. This strong dose of indoctrination, it was hoped, would foster solidarity by 
binding women together through the unifying identity of a gareeb didi.  
In addition to identity-work, Jeevika also sought to ritualize the process of coming 
together. Meetings of the SHGs, VOs and CLF were infused with discipline and sanctity. In the 
 initial days of group formation, Jeevika staff and the community mobilizers taught women the 
significance of sitting together in a circle formation. The practice of sitting in a circle, a spatial 
arrangement aimed at fostering inclusion and giving voice, was novel to the women as was the 
act of introducing themselves in every meeting with their own name and the names of their group 
and the VO (for example, “My name is Sita Devi, Janki Swayam Sahayta Samooh (name of 
SHG), Archana VO (name of VO)”). The predictably recurring practice of participating in 
weekly and semi-monthly meetings that were held in public spaces, sitting in a circle and 
speaking up started the process of deconstructing the participants’ existing “habitus” – the way 
women carried themselves within the gendered and relational domestic space of the house – and 
cultivating a new “habitus”. Along with this, verbally affirming their affiliation to a new 
collective entity was a symbolic way of claiming and proclaiming their access to institutional 
spaces that were previously out of their reach, and of taking on a new identity untethered from 
caste, marriage and family. In one instance, when women complained about the village resisting 
and constraining their movement, the project helped organize a VO meeting at the main 
intersection of the village, instead of their usual meeting place inside the village temple. This 
was intended to further stake a claim for the Jeevika didis on public spaces and to “visualize their 
existence” (Ramganj, Cycle 2, Mallah tola FGD).  
 Along with these features, there was another novel act that the women were required to 
undertake at the start of every meeting. This was the ritualized singing of the Jeevika song 
scripted by the intervention, the words of which were “Badhte kadam” (Forward steps/ Stepping 
forward). At a glance, observing the women sing in unison may appear simply as their 
compliance to the intervention’s dictates. But this act collided with the conventionalized 
performance of gender (like keeping voices subdued) and, therefore, had transformative potential 
 that the women sometimes realized in special moments. For example, Gulaab Devi, a veteran 
CRP in Ramganj, spoke about how the song gave her inspiration during mobilization drives (new 
group formation) when she confronted verbal abuse from men of dominant castes. At these 
junctures, she reminded herself and her fellow mobilizers of the Jeevika song, as a reminder of 
the essence of what they did and its significance. These seemingly trivial practices – sitting in a 
circle, introducing oneself by group identity, singing the song – were orchestrated social 
performances that the women in the treatment villages had been repeating every week for seven 
years. In many cases these practices had aided the construction a strong collective identity tied 
firmly to group affiliation.  
 An exemplary incident that substantiates this point is one that Labho devi, from the Dom20 
caste, proudly narrated to her peers and the researchers. This incident had occurred during a CRP 
drive, where a Yadav man had verbally harassed her during the mobilization process. She 
recounted with much pride the slew of swear words she used to push back, and how she 
“finished him off” with her speech. She ended by saying, 
 … and then at last, he asks me ““What’s your name?” I said, my name? Go 
anywhere in Ramganj and ask them the following – Labho Devi, Archana VO – 
anyone will tell you who I am. Is that enough for you? Go to Premnagar block, ask 
the BPM if he knows Labho Devi, Archana VO, and he’ll tell you. Is that enough 
for you? Go to the district office, ask Varun the DPM if he knows Labho Devi, 
Archana VO, and he’ll tell you. Is that enough for you? 
 
Affiliation with the SHG and the VO had become alternative sources of identity and dignity, free 
of the ignominy of poverty and crippling caste status.   
 Another identity that Jeevika staffs worked to establish was centered on capability. They 
created idealized portrayals of ‘saksham Jeevika didi’ (capable women) as those who were 
                                                      
20 Caste occupationally associated with burial and cremation, which are viewed as unclean tasks. 
 competent in moving beyond the threshold of the house, the quintessential architectural marker 
of domesticity and femininity: “A Jeevika didi is one who can do more much more than just 
stoking the fire and cooking at home. She is a woman that can work inside as well as outside the 
home. She can get real work done” (Jeevika Madhubani district office, Cycle 9, CRP training). 
Being in the public domain was actively supported, and if women were afraid to do it alone, they 
were encouraged to do it collectively. The idea of being mobile was delinked from a woman’s 
morality and firmly tied up instead with ideas of self-sufficiency and capability and her ability to 
push herself out of economic and social deprivation.  
 
Joiners in Treatment Villages 
 
The meetings and the required mobility, the new discourse and identity had started the process of 
undoing the everyday practice of gender. From having their voices subdued by notions of 
interactional propriety within the relational hierarchy of the family, women now had the 
institutional scope for leaving the perimeter of their house and speaking with strangers. One 
participant depicted the dramatic change in this way: “Earlier we were not allowed to stand on 
the entrance of the house, and women used to be reprimanded if their voice was a little too loud 
or audible outside their home. But now we can go anywhere we please. (Saifpur, Cycle 1, 
Chaudhary tola, FGD).” Rekha Chaudhary from Saifpur described how the restrictions on 
mobility and interaction had fallen off with time.  
Earlier I was confined to my house, I had no freedom to talk to anyone. My brother-
in-law would ask me not to go out in the village and my brothers didn’t like for me 
to be working. They had apprehensions about me joining the group. But now 
women have really moved ahead. Now women are not burdened with restrictions 
anymore. Now we talk to other women, even men if required… 
(Saifpur, Cycle 4, Rekha Choudhary, Kalwar tola) 
 
A woman who was a community mobilizer explained it from her unique perspective. 
 Earlier I never used to go anywhere. But ever since my association with Jeevika, 
I've started managing a lot of work outside home. Typically, I would go out to 
conduct meetings and to do SHG related work. I even had to go live in the block 
office once until our bank linkages were done. But then I realized that if I keep 
going out for Jeevika work and not for work that my family needs done then it 
will look bad. So now I go to the market when my children need things. I even go 
to their school when needed. One thing is for sure, that when a woman starts 
going out of the house, then the in-laws and everyone assumes that she can 
manage everything, both inside and outside the house  
(Saifpur, Cycle 4, Sita Devi, Kalwaar tola) 
 
Even more spectacular transformations occurred among some of the most disadvantaged 
lower caste women like Anita Devi and Labho Devi, from Ramganj.  Anita was a middle-aged 
widow from the Hajaam tola. The fact of her being lower caste, widowed, living with her 
parents, being vocal and defiant,21 and most importantly being mobile consistently brought 
shame to her and her family and made them the object of ridicule. When Jeevika was rolled out 
in her village, she was the first to join and to help the project staff recruit members by 
approaching families widely in the village. Because she was seen working outside with unknown 
men, villagers targeted her with ridicule and vulgar comments. Being a ‘first mover’ she quickly 
rose to the top becoming the President of her group and of the VO. In time she became a licensed 
PDS dealer22 within Jeevika. She proudly reported that, since her status had changed, no one 
dared to make any comments on her being “freefain” (mobile). She was now treated as a 
                                                      
21 She taught herself the art of Madhubani painting, which is closely guarded by Brahmins and 
Kayasths and has a national and international market, and earned a livelihood through it. 
22 PDS stands for Public Distribution System and refers to government regulated price controlled 
shops for food staples and other essential goods distributed by the government for all 
households, with below-poverty line households being offered the most subsidized prices.  
 respected community member. She was welcomed in every neighborhood, and women looked up 
to her as a trusted figure. The fact that Jeevika work had taken beyond her village, beyond the 
state (Delhi and Hyderabad), and even beyond the country (Bangladesh) was a matter of great 
pride for others in her village.  
Labho and her family were also actively discriminated against and considered 
untouchable throughout their lives. No one visited her house, which was on the periphery of the 
village right next to the open defecation area, and she was not allowed to visit anyone, let alone 
to be within physical proximity or interact with them. She was now one of the highest paid 
members of Jeevika in Ramganj. She was an active CRP who had gone for more than fifteen 
CRP drives far beyond the confines of her home. So much so that she spoke with disdain of 
housewives that stayed at home. “The other didis that come with me for CRP drives frustrate me. 
They are women who can feed (others), women who can clean and scrub utensils, but once they 
are outside they can’t get even a word out of their mouths (Ramganj, Cycle 6, Labho Devi, CRP, 
Dom tola).” 
 
Contesting Conventions: Resistance & Resilience to Cultural Change 
In Ramganj and Saifpur, men and many women reacted to the new ideas and discourses 
promoting women’s mobility with a lot of resistance. Men would question the morality of 
women who were part of the project.  “They would say, such and such person’s daughter and 
daughter-in-law have gone out of the home. People would say that these women’s groups are 
spoiling women; women are going out freely and being indecent. Many would think it’s wrong, 
and women joining the group are bad women. Some men would even suspect their wives 
(Saifpur, Cycle 1, Janki Devi, Kalwar tola).” For many upper caste women, being part of Jeevika 
 was extremely difficult in the beginning as their husbands would resort to violence in protest of 
their enhanced mobility.  
I faced a lot of opposition. Once I had to go to Muzaffarpur for training. There was 
this woman…She had said that it was a one-day training, and I would have to stay 
back for only one night. It took four days instead. By that time, everyone at home 
was worried. Those days there were no mobile phones, and I did not leave any 
contact number where they could call me. I too couldn’t inform them. When I came 
back home, my husband beat me up. He asked me to leave home. But where could 
I have gone?  
          (Saifpur, Cycle 1, Sita Devi, Chaudhary tola) 
 
Some village men passed crude remarks targeted at husbands who had allowed their 
wives to enroll in Jeevika. As a result, some men who had initially allowed their wives to step 
out forced their withdrawal out of peer pressure.  
On seeing women convene meetings and going out of the village, villagers (men) 
used to tease and criticize the husbands of Jeevika didis. “You (husband) are 
working in the village, while your wife works outside the village with other men!” 
This often caused intra-household conflict between husband and wife over her 
enrolment in the group. 
 (Ramganj, Cycle 2, Mallah tola FGD)  
 
The husband of Sanjeeda Khatoon, a Jeevika member since 2007, reacted in this manner in 
response to comments made by community members.  
Two years back my husband was not keeping well; he had a severe infection in his 
liver. We borrowed 100,000 rupees23 for his treatment. So I thought, why don’t I 
go for a Jeevika training, it will be helpful in repaying the loan (because Jeevika 
could provide access to a inexpensive credit).  We left for a one-month training to 
Sarai (a town in Bihar), but I had to come back in eleven days. It was training for a 
CM (community mobilizer) drive. I made thirty-five groups in eleven days while I 
was there. After I had left (my village), men from our community started speaking 
ill of me. They said, “Oh look, the man stays at home and the woman has gone out 
to work!” My husband got angry with this and asked me to return. Many members 
from the Muslim community were not allowed to go for the CRP drive again. 
                                                      
23 About $1,600. 
 Women from the Kushwaha, Mallah, Ram community don’t face these problems 
at home anymore.  
(Saifpur, Cycle 3, Sanjeeda Khatoon, Sheikh tola)  
 
This sanctioning behavior has to be simultaneously understood as keeping women within 
conventionalized boundaries of womanly behavior as well as men zealously defending their 
manliness. Often, men were reacting not just as individual husbands trying to assert their power 
within a conjugal dynamic, but as members of a larger community that saw this intervention as 
threatening emasculation. Hence, in the short run, women’s defiance of gender norms, 
specifically mobility restrictions, was sometimes met with violence and ridicule. Over time these 
instances had reduced as mobility was legitimized and as Jeevika women grew in numbers.  
 Women from upper castes also reacted to the intervention in the initial days with resistance 
and some of them continue to distance themselves from it. Women like Anita and Labho were 
not hard to mobilize. It was upper caste women like Asha Devi and Bindu Jha, who would 
usually not share space with lower caste women, who were hard to bring into the project’s fold.  
Particularly in Ramganj where Maithil Brahmins were the dominant caste, some women still 
chose not to join Jeevika because, in their worldview, it was not dignified work. One of the non-
joiners explained her reasons “I am not attached with any saving group. In groups of lower castes 
there is just too much backbiting and bickering. All of them are illiterate and fight too much. 
That is what my husband said. (Ramganj, Cycle 2, Gullo Devi, Brahmin tola)”  
 Another Brahmin woman from the Pathak tola, Urmila Devi, had refused to join the group 
at its start because as she explained, “This is the work of chhotka log (small, i.e. inferior, 
people). (Ramganj, Cycle 1, Urmila Devi, Pathak tola)” Eventually she joined, but refused to let 
her daughter-in-law join, “She’s an educated girl; she’s meant for bigger things. She won’t sit 
with us illiterates, no way! (Cycle 4)” She would also often complain about Anita, disliking the 
 fact that everyone in the village now listened to her even though she was of a lower caste. Lately 
however, she has been more supportive and accepting.  
You know, when a woman sees other women go out, she is willing to try it out 
herself… Now, I too have gone to other villages on CRP drives. We don’t go alone; 
four-five other women are also part of the group. It is not wrong to do so, even 
though the men at home don’t like that we are moving together, but we are still 
adamant and we go. You tell me, what is wrong with going to other villages and 
speaking with other women? Nitish (Chief Minister) has made Jeevika for our 
benefit; we have to spread the word. He has tempted even those of us from upper 
castes. With what? With a steady income (the promise that cheap loans and skills 
training would expand livelihoods).   
    (Ramganj, Cycle 6, Urmila Devi, Pathak tola)  
 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the process of re-negotiating boundaries of 
womanhood and caste is an ongoing and fluid one. While some women were optimistic about the 
changes as they unfolded, others were skeptical. Bindu Jha, for instance, as the wife of the 
temple’s head priest, struggled to make peace with the enhanced mobility of lower caste women. 
As a community mobilizer, she worked hard to convince the staff and the researchers that she 
had come a long way – that ten years ago, she would not even allow the shadow of a Ram 
woman to touch her, but now she allowed them into her courtyard and hosted their meeting. 
Observing her group meetings however revealed the gap between rhetoric and practice. She sat 
on the bed along with the two other Brahmin group members, while the remaining eleven women 
from the Ram community jostled for space on the floor. She collected the Brahmin women’s 
savings by hand and insisted that the rest leave their money on the edge of the bed. She kept 
women from the Ram community at arm’s length. The Ram women complained about her in her 
absence, and it often became a subject of ridicule, both in her absence and her presence. In 
similar vein, Labho Devi claimed that she was acutely aware of the fact that her mobility was 
circumscribed, and it would last only as long as her identity as a Jeevika woman lasted. 
 I am allowed to be in the temple premises during our VO meetings because I am a 
Jeevika didi. But the day I am not a member of my savings group, you’ll see, they 
will not accept my donations (to the temple) or allow me in the temple premises 
ever again. That is the fate of a Domin (Dom woman).  
(Ramganj, Cycle 6, Labho Devi, CRP, Dom tola) 
 
 
II. Public Debate and Action  
 
Spaces for public debate and deliberation at the local level in rural India were strongly associated 
with the Panchayati Raj, which has been established to promote decentralization and grassroots 
democracy.  It was in the Gram Sabhas (village assemblies) that the drama of deliberation and 
everyday democracy was supposed to unfold (Rao and Sanyal 2010). However, rural Bihar did 
not have an established system of holding the constitutionally mandated village assemblies for a 
long time (Corbridge et al 2001).  
Panchayat elections were held in 2001 after a gap of twenty-three years, but the PRIs 
neither had functions nor funds. Moreover, evidence suggested that even in the 2001 elections, 
the upper castes were able to retain their foothold at the grassroots level (even though they lost 
political ground at higher levels of government), and the sociopolitical profiles of elected 
Mukhiyas in the 2001 elections were largely similar to those elected in 1978 (Pankaj and Singh 
2005). Virganj for instance, had a male Brahmin Mukhiya (village president) and Sarpanch 
(judicial head) for thirty years unopposed. As a result, Brahmins dominated every aspect of 
decision-making and public debate in the village, and villagers complained of a bias in favor of 
Brahmins in disbursing the benefits of government-subsidized schemes. “Whenever there is 
conflict or a big decision is to be taken, there are ten senior male members of the village that are 
called upon. They were all Brahmins for a long time, only now two new members have joined – 
one Yadav and one Dhobi. (Virganj Baseline Report)”  
 
 Control Villages 
The Nitish Kumar government introduced laws that reserved fifty percent of seats in village 
councils for women, exceeding the thirty three per cent mandated by the Indian constitution. As 
a result, the number of women representatives grew in successive elections from 2006 and 2011.   
In practice, however, women in the control villages did not see the PRIs as a legitimate problem-
solving arena that catered to their needs. Instead, they considered it to be a male-dominated 
space, which did not have room for their voice or interests.   In 2001, when Bihar held elections 
to the village councils for the first time, very few women voted.  In the next two elections (2006 
and 2011), even though half the seats were reserved for women, in practice, the husbands of the 
woman candidates would fight the elections. The husbands of the winners would rule the roost. 
This was termed as the ‘proxy mukhiya’ phenomenon.  
Interviews with public officials in the control villages revealed that women were seldom 
seen as capable of being active participants in public debates. Most of the women in Virganj and 
Bhimpur had never attended the Aam Sabha, a forum intended to resolve individual and 
collective problems raised by participants and for selecting beneficiaries for government 
schemes. The only women that attended these meetings were widows seeking their old-age 
pension or their housing rights under a subsidy scheme. For the most part, it was seen as a forum 
for men, and even if women wanted to attend, they were denied information and access.  
In the only known instance when women arrived in large numbers at an aam sabha in 
Virganj, they were asked to come for being photographed with the Mukhiya. “We went one time, 
but you know what goes on there? We went, all of us women, and they took a group photograph 
and made us sign on a piece of paper, and then we left” (Virganj, Cycle 8, Arula Devi). The 
Sarpanch of Virganj disclosed his attitude toward women attempting to enter the public sphere.  
 These days women have become the seth24 (with sarcasm)! But does that mean they 
are equal? One time I went to a BDO in a neighboring village who told me that a 
bunch of illiterate women had been selected from their wards as mukhiya 
candidates. I tell you, how can a bunch of illiterate women fight for elections! 
That’s the problem with women’s empowerment!  
(Virganj, Cycle 8, Rajeshwar Jha, Sarpanch, Brahmin tola) 
 
For the most part, in control villages, women had never experienced the state 
directly, instead, had seen it as mediated through the observation of male household 
members. As a result, a majority of the women across caste and income strata were 
unaware of the actual doings of the state (how to get entitlements, where to go for public 
services, who to meet for obtaining signatures etc.).  
 
Joiners in Treatment Villages 
In strong contrast, women enrolled in Jeevika, particularly those women who were position 
holders in their groups, regularly made their presence felt in the public space of debate and 
action. They attended Aam Sabhas, occasionally with the stated intention of making noise, freely 
voicing their opinions against corrupt mukhiyas and positioning themselves as being opposed to 
politics. This was not surprising given that Jeevika, in part, was designed and set up in parallel to 
the existing local governance system (PRIs). The apex body of the SHGs, the Cluster Federation 
(CLF), had been created with the envisioned goal for it to become the principal conduit for the 
multiple women-centered interventions run by the government.  
Even though creating distrust of the PRIs or attempting to replace them was not the 
intention of the intervention, quite often, the dominant discourse among Jeevika women was that 
                                                      
24 This word connotes a person, inevitably a man, who controls important material resources and 
is powerful. 
 the panchayat could not be trusted, and it was time they took matters in their own hands. Some 
of the women were fiercely critical of these institutions. “We are quite against the mukhiya. 
When we said we wanted to attend the Aam Sabha, he just stopped holding them! (Ramganj, 
Cycle 7, Anu Devi, CRP, Dhanuk tola).” The women also felt strongly about corruption in the 
PRIs and were fairly vocal on the issue “You know, they came to bribe us once. They said, 
“Here goes the money, now get me all the votes from your Jeevika ladies.” We rejected the 
money and told him, just win fair and square if you can.” Some of the women felt confident that, 
given an opportunity, the Cluster Federation (CLF) could replace the PRIs in some years. “I 
think if our CLF keeps moving in the right direction, then a day will come when they will have to 
come to us.” (Saifpur, Cycle 7, Sudha Devi, CLF president, Gopalpur tola).  
Indeed, many of the Jeevika leaders presented themselves as conduits or brokers for 
public services. They had become the contact points for other women for all kinds of problem 
reporting and solving, from difficulties in getting their due share of government subsidized food 
staples to old age pensions and subsidies for housing and sanitation. Women brought their 
concerns to the leaders of the Jeevika SHGs and VOs instead of the PRIs, and the leaders then 
arbitrated with the PRIs or with other institutions and personnel to resolve the problems. For 
instance, Sudha Devi, the CLF president in Saifpur, spoke about how she particularly enjoyed 
this aspect of her work – problem-solving and helping other women. Having risen through the 
ranks and having won Jeevika elections at all three levels – SHG, VO, and CLF – she considered 
it her responsibility to take care of her ‘constituency’ of women.  (Our conversations with her 
were frequently interrupted by women coming to her doorstep for help or information.)  Her 
home had turned into an open and inclusive problem-solving arena, where she regularly 
performed her role as a broker with competence comparable to any skilled politician:  
 I wish I could take the law into my own hands. Then I would take care of the thirty 
to forty VOs in my CLF and push each one of those ten thousand didis forward. 
Then we would show everyone that women are not weak. We can sit at the same 
table with you…You know, all the poor are my supporters. That is because I am 
against the rich.  
(Saifpur, Cycle 7, Sudha Devi, Gopalpur tola)  
 
The cases that were informally brought to women leaders who had risen from the rank 
and file of the intervention were mostly focused on land issues involving Jeevika members and 
non-members. While most cases were dealt with on an individual basis, very often these cases 
were seen as a means of correcting historical injustices over land meted out by men of dominant 
castes to women of backward castes.  
Given the kind of unity among women, we do take action whenever needed. For 
instance, one of the members of Ganga Jeevika SHG had a land dispute with a 
Brahmin. The way to her land is through the land of this Brahmin, and he was 
blocking it, so that no one could pass. All of us women went together and resolved 
the issue.  
(Ramganj, Cycle 1, Anita Devi, Hajaam tola) 
 
In Saifpur, too, there had been instances of women arbitrating in land disputes. The reason 
women felt they had to take matters into their own hands was because the existing institutional 
system did not listen to them, and also because they received no help from the village men.  
 
Men sort out their issues amongst themselves. But when it comes to women, if we 
get to know about any land disputes of members or non-members, we club together 
and work to sort out the problem. They have to listen to us then, and why wouldn’t 
they? We go in large numbers, and non-group members also join us. No man can 
dare ignore us then.  
(Saifpur, Cycle 4, Anita Devi, CM, Choudhary tola)  
 
Jeevika members had also arbitrated in financial disputes. Poonam Devi gave the 
example of solving a moneylending case.  
“Didi (sister), earlier all conflicts were dealt with by men. Women were not even 
allowed to be present. But now things have changed. Now ten to twenty women 
can come together and go and solve any problem. Someone from this village had 
 given a loan of Rs. 4000 to a person from another village. The creditor’s two 
daughter-in-laws were members of Jeevika. Men from that family would go and 
demand their money but they (debtor) refused to repay. Then ten of us didis hired 
an autorickshaw and went there and demanded the money and compelled them to 
repay the loan right away. The debtor repaid. Things have changed didi. Now we 
are confident and can talk to unknown men without hesitation. We got exposure 
and learnt so many things in Jeevika.  
      (Saifpur, Cycle 1, Phulwati devi, Chaudhary tola) 
 
Jeevika members had also taken action in disputes involving women and their employers.  
Once a brick kiln owner was not refunding Rs. 4000 for four years to one of our 
members. All of us women hired a Jeep and chased him. We warned him that if he 
didn’t repay instantly it would cost him his bricks and goats. Finally he repaid on 
the spot. Women’s collective has established its status in the community, and often 
people are scared of it. Whenever we go out in a group, people passing by are alert 
and they start whispering to each other. Earlier they were disrespectful, but now no 
one dares to be so.  
(Saifpur, Cycle 1, Paswan tola FGD)  
 
Group members also arbitrated on behalf of women in domestic violence cases. Unlike 
women in the control villages who were reluctant to protest on behalf of other women, fearing 
they would get rebuffed or entangled, women in Ramganj and Saifpur found strength in numbers 
and did not hesitate to take action. 
Yes, we routinely discuss these issues in our meetings. If a group of thirteen 
members can’t stand up for each other, then what is the use? If I won’t intervene, 
the woman will die. It happens in every family. If it is a very serious matter we 
call for a meeting, and they (perpetrator) are made to apologize. All the women 
from all the groups come to the meeting and take a decision.  
(Saifpur, Cycle 3, Razia Khatoon, Tok tola) 
 
Initially men disapproved of women mobilizing and would often mock their wives: “My 
husband would taunt us. He said that he would see what women power could achieve. He had 
doubts about our strength. He felt that when the mukhiya, the sarpanch and the police could not 
resolve the land dispute how would we resolve it. But we did it. (Saifpur, Cycle 1, Sharda 
 Devi).” Participants shared that, over time, their husbands and the community had begun to 
appreciate their efforts to resolve disputes. “They say it is a good thing that women are now 
united and don’t just sit at home. Now they do meetings and are aware of what’s going on in the 
house next door and share it in the group, which also makes other women aware of the recent 
developments in the village. Earlier women didn’t know any better. They didn’t report any 
mistreatment from men of the village. (Saifpur, Cycle 1, Chaudhary tola FGD)”  
Women’s participation in the public space of debate and action had largely 
expressed itself in the forms of problem solving, arbitration and creating alternatives to 
the rule of the sarpanch and mukhiya. The logical conclusion of this process of 
transformation was standing for elections for positions in the local government (PRIs). A 
select few women had fought for panchayat elections. Sudha devi, a CLF leader, felt 
strongly about her chances of winning and, even though she had been unable to oust the 
existing order, she had succeeded in mobilizing women who had rallied for her. She had 
developed a unique political discourse based on rejecting politics and eradicating poverty. 
I had fought for Mukhiya elections, but I lost. The other candidate bought the seat; 
he spent thirteen lakhs.25 And I had no money. I had no money to give to any 
didi…My aspiration was that, if I win, I can do social work; I can do the work for 
all my didis for free; then can you imagine how much our didis would progress? I 
wanted to fight this business of a proxy mukhiya. It’s a women’s seat after all, and 
if a woman wins the election, she should work! Before elections I had declared that 
if I win, then you will find me at every doorstep and in every SHG and VO meeting. 
And I will do your work. I have the jazbaa (will). I’m going to help the poor. I’m 
going to get them what they need… 
(Saifpur, Cycle 7, Sudha Devi, Gopalpur tola) 
 
For Sudha’s counterpart in Ramganj, Navina Devi, the next logical step after becoming 
the CLF president was also to contest the panchayat elections. She contested the elections for the 
                                                      
25 About $20,000. 
 Ward Member position: “Women came in large numbers from eight different villages for the 
election. And everyone voted for me. You know why? Because I’ve made groups everywhere. 
And I’ve done it all by foot.” However, she lost out to her opponent: “I would have won if the 
election had not been rigged by Choudhary. They threatened to be violent when I tried to protest 
against them.” But this did not deter her from aspiring to stand for elections again. She wanted to 
stand for the next Mukhiya elections, “Give me the position and then see.” (Ramganj, Cycle 7, 
Navina Devi, CLF president, Paliwar tola).  
This particular aspect of women’s empowerment had grown without any direct 
facilitation by Jeevika.  In 2006, before women were mobilized into the project, Jeevika staff had 
spent a considerable amount of time gaining “buy-in” (i.e. promise of support or non-
interference) from key members of the panchayat by assuring them that the project had little 
interest in changing the social and political order of the village, and that it was strictly a women’s 
microfinance program. This allowed the project to operate without the interference of the 
panchayati raj institutions (PRIs). However, as the project had garnered increased funding and 
public support, as women’s visibility had been enhanced, and as Jeevika women had developed 
an effective and autonomous problem-solving mechanism that directly challenged the PRIs, the 
Jeevika staff withheld support. Consequently, women often felt let down by the fact that when 
they asked Jeevika for financial or any kind of assistance to fight elections or to fund their 
mobilization for anti-liquor campaigns, they were denied help. To a large extent, therefore, 
Jeevika women’s entry into the public space of debate and action, particularly the sphere of the 
panchayat, can be seen as an unintended consequence of the project, because it was expected to 
run parallel to it and pursue economic goals and not intersect with the established political, 
governance system.  
 However even though the project did not directly facilitate this, it did create the enabling 
environment. The women claimed that “Jeevika does help build leadership skills and instills 
confidence in us to handle a community. No school, no formal education can teach you that. 
(Ramganj, Cycle 7, Veena Paswan, CLF Treasurer, Paswan tola)” Second, the project had 
strengthened the notion of a collective by mobilizing and bringing women together under the 
unifying identity of “gareeb didi” (poor women) and through the system of institutional 
affiliation had significantly improved the terms of recognition under which women participated 
in the public space.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examines the cultural impact of an anti-poverty development intervention, Jeevika, in 
one of the poorest and most patriarchal parts of India (rural Bihar).  Jeevika works by forming 
women’s self-help groups and giving women access to credit in order to induce improvements in 
their livelihoods and to promote gender equality.  We used propensity score matching methods to 
match two pairs of treatment and control villages and tracked them over three years by collecting 
qualitative data to understand the process of change.  Since our method allowed us to compare 
pairs of very similar villages, one subject to the intervention and the other not, we were able to 
isolate the causal effects of Jeevika on the communities.   
 In both treatment and control villages, traditional restrictions placed on women were 
getting relaxed due to increased male out-migration, which resulted in greater exposure to 
comparatively egalitarian ideologies. Also, the absence of migrant men had in some cases 
opened up scope for women to fill in gaps in local labor markets (as agricultural laborers) and 
compelled them to step into the public sphere (of markets and local institutions) when needed for 
their household.  Local democratic politics had also created scope for women to participate in 
 village-level politics through casting their ballots, attending discussions in village assemblies, 
and running for political office.  
Beyond these organic changes, in the treatment villages Jeevika had been able to induce a 
process of more sharply accelerated and acute change. By forming women into SHGs, Jeevika 
had been able to expand the framing of women’s identities from being exclusively based on the 
conventional categories of kinship and caste to include new collective groupings that were meant 
to transcend traditional social boundaries. The conceptions of  ‘gareeb didi’, poor woman/sister, 
and ‘saksham didi’, capable woman/sister, were propagated by the intervention as symbolic 
resources that could facilitate a new form of solidarity exclusively among women and that could 
propel women forward, breaking through the shackles of normative injunctions. 
Moreover, Jeevika infused the environment within which women lived with new 
elements: physical resources such as group money, collections for loan repayments and 
mandatory savings, that women got to regularly handle, count and account for (even though 
within the household they may not have control over or handle the loan monies); and passbooks 
to keep track of money. The institutional environment was radically transformed with the 
creation of new entities: women’s groups; village organizations; and the cluster federation, each 
inaugurating institutional spaces by instituting weekly and semi-monthly meetings. Women’s 
access to existing financial institutions, like banks, had also opened up. The rituals of these new 
institutional spaces – singing the group song, manner of introduction – aimed to serve multiple 
purposes: to dis-embed identity from caste and kinship and anchor it in the group and to inscribe 
new values and meanings.   These physical elements and institutional entities and spaces 
required different cultural competencies and bodily comportments. While some practices 
entailed physical modifications and habituations – how to conduct oneself in a meeting, when 
 and how to sit, when to stand, how to articulate one’s claims and arguments – other practices, 
like handling money, had cognitive effects. Thus, participation in Jeevika led to changes in 
women’s habitus and to the cultivation of new cultural competencies and capabilities. 
Over time, these influences instilled new preferences and dispositions, which were most 
evident from the instances of collective arbitration by the women. The most dramatic 
transformation of preference and dispositions were observed in a select group of these women 
who had developed the aspiration to enter mainstream political institutions. That this had 
happened without any institutional encouragement or support (policy of political non-
interference) was a testament to the causal influence of changed preferences and dispositions as a 
result of being habituated into the meanings and values promoted by the intervention and that 
infused the physical objects, symbolic resources, and the institutional spaces created by it.  
As more women entered spheres of activity outside domesticity and the household and 
participated in civic, political and financial institutions they broke down long-standing normative 
restrictions that were constitutive of the symbolic boundary of gender. Conceptions of women as 
womanly (coy, docile, incapable) and men as manly (the antithesis) were challenged and new 
conceptions were expressed. Initially these new conceptions were often cloaked in sarcasm and 
ridicule. But, with the progression of the intervention, politically powerful men had started 
treating women SHG members as a group to be contended and negotiated with (even if initially 
for winning their en bloc vote).  Men had thus yielded to the identity of women as SHG-
members as separate from their old caste and family identities.  
In development interventions such as Jeevika this process of normative change occurred 
through the iterative process of collective violation of classical behavioral injunctions on women, 
which were for the most part tolerated without en masse public sanctioning (although there are 
 cases of household based opposition and violence) because of the lure of the financial incentive 
of less expensive credit, and which led to the gradual receding of the symbolic boundary of 
gender. Internalized schemas relevant to gender, i.e. notions of women’s worth that had 
implications for women’s status in society, were seriously challenged by the intervention. This 
intervention, similar to many other microcredit programs, by focusing on women and privileging 
them by giving women exclusive access to groups and loans, had instituted an alternative to 
“doubly dissimilar encounters” that were predominant in every other sphere of village life. By 
formally restricting microcredit to women (even though these loans were transferred within the 
household by women to men), these interventions created an invaluable opportunity for women 
to participate (more) equally and to be acknowledged as equally competent to similar men at a 
socially valued task. This task was not simply to access money in the form of loans (because 
simply accessing loans does not require much skill and one can access loans from money 
lenders) but the associated institutional task of managing credit at the group level, including 
taking financial decisions on the disbursement of group loans, managing repayments, and the 
general financial management of the groups. These tasks were perceived in this context as 
masculine tasks, because they required circulation in the public world of institutions, broad based 
interactions and being mobile, and a certain type of cognitive ability, capacities that women were 
typically thought to be deficient in. So, ironically, even though sex categorization had been made 
even more salient by this and similar interventions by giving women exclusive access and 
formally excluding men, yet they did make a positive impression about women’s worth by 
allowing only women to engage in activities that were thought to be typically masculine and 
socially valued, because it brought some measure of financial relief to poor families.   
 Change of gender norms in the treatment villages was a vital contribution of this 
intervention and one that had happened even in the absence of any significant poverty reduction 
impact. But this process of induced change was an uneven and contentious one, with women 
who were the vanguard of change facing the bulk of the abuse and disapproval.  A conservative 
assessment from this data suggests that regularity norms changed faster than oughtness norms. 
Importantly, change of norms was not a uniform process, and there were class and gender 
differences in the pace of normative change. Compared to upper castes, lower castes were less 
immune from change because of their economic necessity, which often forced the men to 
migrate and the women to perform the role of household heads and to participate in such 
development interventions. Sometimes, norms changed faster among women (barring class 
differences) than among men when women were at the frontline of new discursive messages 
from development interventions, messages that reinscribed the meaning of actions. Among men, 
husbands of joiners had become gradually open to altering their normative expectations about 
gendered behavior through the course of their wives’ participation in the intervention compared 
to husbands of non-joiners and men in control villages.  
Whether these normative changes can sustain beyond the time period of the intervention 
is a question that cannot be answered with any certainty. Indeed there are plenty of historical 
examples from countries like Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka where women broke out of 
normative restrictions to participate shoulder-to-shoulder with men in revolutions and civil wars 
for decades, only to have their rights and freedoms from pre-revolutionary and revolutionary 
periods revoked and cast back to conventional lives and sidelined from political institutions after 
successful revolutions.  
 In the terms of the sociological theories of culture, therefore, ideologies of gender 
equality and empowerment (a cultural system of meanings and values) that are promoted by 
modern day anti-poverty interventions facilitate (a) the creation of particular kinds of entities and 
institutional spaces to which women have privileged access and the exclusive right to participate 
in; and (b) the cultivation of new cultural competencies (concepts, meanings, language, rituals) 
and “capabilities” (Sen 1990) that defy the classical conventions of gender. Combined together, 
for women, these entail a process of opening up their internalized schemas to revision and 
remolding their embodied cast of habitus. These changes are reflected in individual and 
collective practices and performances, and all together these results in a process of shifting the 
symbolic boundary of gender as it exists, changing men’s and women’s ideas of what it means to 
be a woman. In time, activities that were seen as the antithesis of womanliness come to be 
viewed as normal. All of these changes, to express it in Butler’s language, increase the livability 
of women’s lives even if they do not ameliorate the material deprivations that women suffer.  
In our view, our findings support an integrative view of culture (Patterson 2014). The 
new entities created by development interventions, like the Jeevika SHGs and VOs, are 
representations of “cultural configurations”, i.e. networks of persons and associated ensembles of 
knowledge - “declarative knowledge” (ideologies and facts associated with the intervention); 
“evaluative knowledge” (norms and values upheld by the intervention, and symbolic resources 
created by it); “procedural knowledge” (habitus and cultural competencies cultivated through 
participation in the intervention). Development interventions that work through forming new 
groupings and ideologies add to the cultural configurations available to people and also enable 
new forms of collective action and alternative systems of authority. This is a particularly salient 
change for women in contexts where the family and kin group are the sole cultural 
 configurations available to them. This multiplication of “cultural configurations” is significant 
because it gives economically and socially disadvantaged women access to a well-defined 
network of people (largely composed of peer-women) and access to new systems of ‘knowledge’ 
with which they can challenge old generationally transmitted systems of knowledge that is more 
concerned with preserving boundaries rather than disrupting them. 
What our study shows, that is not very well captured in the sociology of culture literature, 
is that culture is not an immutable constraint.  Seemingly unchangeable things like norms and 
habitus can be changed within a relatively short period of time. In this respect, social movements 
come to mind for showing how successful movements can yield dramatic changes within a 
relatively short time-span. In this regard, we find the political commitment (of ruling parties) to 
be a key variable that sets the stage within which development interventions flourish or flounder. 
We also find that the escalating pressure to ‘scale-up’ such interventions can have ambiguous 
effects – they might increase coverage of the population in need but at the cost of diluting these 
processes of induced and facilitated cultural change. 
The arguments presented in this paper on the process of cultural change have 
implications for how culture matters for development interventions, a discourse that is currently 
dominated by a behavioral perspective (World Bank 2015).  Our analysis suggests that is 
incomplete.  Shifting culture is not just a matter of nudging individuals to move towards new 
forms of behavior. Simply tricking the brain into behaving differently cannot result in long-term 
change, without a fundamental reconfiguration in the relationships of power at the household and 
community levels.  Behavioral change (in how women and men can act and interact), when it is 
aimed at diminishing male privilege and achieving greater gender equality, is a deeply political 
 process that entails undoing gender as it exists.  This requires the formation of new solidarities 
and the recalibration of symbolic and social boundaries.   
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